



Rijkswaterstaat
Ministry of Infrastructure
and Water Management

Maeslant Barrier

History, Present & Future

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Maeslant Barrier more in detail



Maeslant Barrier



- 1997
- 2 gates
- no sluice


Maeslant Barrier - *Final part of Delta Works*





- Preparation started in 1987
- Competition
- 6 alternative designs
- Design, construct and maintenance



Maeslant Barrier - Final part of Delta Works




Maeslant Barrier - Final part of Delta Works



Maeslant Barrier




Construction of the Maeslant Barrier



Maeslant Barrier - Sill



Filterbed, sand, gravel, big stones




15 x 5 x 3 m each

630 tons each



64 threshold parts, submerged



Maeslant Barrier - Ball joint




revision in 2003/04



10 m diameter

680 tons



3 directions of movement



52.000 tons foundation

Maeslant Barrier - Retaining Wall



210 m wide




22 m high



13 compartments



depth 17 m



26 valves &
30 pumps per wall

Maeslant Barrier - Locomobile



6 engines



Electro/hydraulic
propulsion unit



6,000 kN pulling force



Rack and pinion



For horizontal movement and fixation

Maeslant Barrier - Trusses



Maeslant Barrier - Trusses



20 m high

90 mm thickness


1.80 m diameter

237 m long

Maeslant Barrier - Dock and Dock Doors



10 m deep



Maintenance retaining walls




Collision protection




Regular and anchored walls

Maeslant Barrier - Support and Control Systems



Impression of closure








Various groups of visitors



... and high officials



Introduction to Risk Based Asset Management





Changes in Maintenance and Operations from three new perspectives

1. Focus on reliability related issues and operational use

2. Trained Staff contributes to reliability

- Technical expertise and safety awareness
- Training and exercise
- Procedures and instructions (to prevent failures)
- Tests and exams

3. Probabilistic maintenance and operations


- Corrective maintenance
failure? → repair
- Preventive maintenance
example: Exceeded mileage? → replace
- Predictive maintenance
example: maintain only when failure may occur
- Choice of strategy depends on risk analysis and type and contribution of component to the operational use of the barrier



Introduction to Risk Based Asset Maintenance



Reliability dock door
Fault tree analysis - example






. . . down to maintenance level



2 Flood defense walls
13 compartments
Total 60 pumps

Pump characteristics

- Failure probability (demand): $8,6 * 10^{-6}$ / each time
- Failure probability (mission): $3,0 * 10^{-6}$ / hr
- Mission duration: 8 hours



Maintenance characteristics

- Test frequency: 1 / month
- Inspection frequency: 1 / year
- Replacement interval: 30 years
- Maximum repair time: 48 hours

Introduction to Risk Based Asset Maintenance



Spare parts on site



Introduction to Risk Based Asset Maintenance



Fault tree includes

- Redundancy
- Software and hardware failure
- Absence of data on water levels
- Level of training and expertise
- Human error and human corrective capabilities
- External influences (lightning, collision, wind mills)

Approach


- Regular updates (monthly/annually)
- Measures to be taken if actual failure rate is worse than required failure rate




Introduction to Risk Based Asset Maintenance



Fault tree Maeslant barrier



- 9,000 Basic Events
 - 5,000 related to components
 - 4,000 modeling events (e.g. fraction of time leading to failure)
- 210 maintenance groups (clustering of similar components)
- 3 top events:
 - Failure to close
 - Failure to retain water
 - Failure to re-open
- Roughly $1,600 * A4$
- Updated twice a year




Safety levels stated in Dutch Flood Defence Act

Introduction to Risk Based Asset Maintenance




Reality can be hard to model: Human error

- All bolts tightened too hard




Introduction to Operational Team





Closure schedule



Introduction to Operational Proces




Press and
camera crew



VIP Program




Access road: traffic
jam and almost
inundated (by water
and spectators)



The audience



Introduction to Knowledge Management





- Necessary knowledge and expertise is scarce
 - Can often only be gained through active involvement in operational work.
 - Every SSB has his own specific characteristics
 - SSB may be subject to inadequate attention to knowledge development and knowledge retention
 - Risks could lead to high costs and reputational damage (political governance) and pressure on the flood barriers.
- ➔ **This requires a robust strategy of what knowledge where and how to secure**




Rijkswaterstaat
Ministerie van Infrastructuur en Milieu

RWS BEDRIJFSINFORMATIE


Knowledge Strategy Storm Surge Barriers

Knowledge development and retention for Storm Surge Barriers

Date	April 2018
Status	Final
Version	1.0



Knowledge Strategy Approach



Knowledge Strategy Examples



Games



Knowledge Scan


Hoofddomeinsveld	Vraag	Antw.	0	1	2	3	4	5	KW	0	1	2	3	4	KW	0	1	2	3	4	Kenmerkwaarde
Risicogestuurd beheer en of Faillissements beheer		2	5	3	2	1	2	12	17	1	3	4	2	2	25	-1	-2	1	0	2	8
Risicogestuurd beheer en of Onderhoudsmanagement		2	3	4	1	2	12	22	22	1	3	2	3	2	24	-1	0	-2	2	0	2
Risicogestuurd beheer en of Inkoop/contractmanagement		2	3	5	2	12	19	1	3	5	2	2	19	19	-1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Risicogestuurd beheer en of Integrale veiligheid		4	2	6	12	26	3	2	5	1	26	0	-1	0	-1	1	1	1	1	1	3
Objectkennis	Integrale techniek en ontwerp	1	2	4	4	1	12	26	1	3	5	2	29	29	0	-2	-1	1	1	1	3
Objectkennis	Organisatie en werkwijze: Operationele inzet (slu)	1	4	3	3	1	12	23	23	3	3	3	2	26	-1	-1	0	0	1	3	3
Objectkennis	Organisatie en werkwijze: Beheer en onderhoud	4	4	4	4	12	24	24	2	2	7	1	27	27	0	-2	-2	3	0	3	3
Objectkennis	Watersysteem in relatie tot Object	3	2	6	1	12	18	1	2	3	4	1	24	24	-2	0	-1	4	0	6	6
D: Installatie technologie	Elektrische installaties	2	3	3	4	12	21	2	2	2	5	2	27	27	0	-3	-1	1	2	6	6
D: Installatie technologie	Sensoren, bekabeling	3	2	3	4	12	20	2	1	2	3	3	26	26	-1	-1	-1	-1	1	4	4
D: Installatie technologie	Energievoorziening	3	3	4	2	12	17	2	2	4	1	2	21	21	-1	-1	0	-1	2	2	2
D: Informatie technologie	Basis IV-systemen (ondersteunend aan basisinfor)	1	5	3	3	12	20	2	5	3	1	1	25	25	-1	-3	2	0	1	5	5
D: Informatie technologie	Functionele IV-systemen (ondersteunend aan de j)	3	2	5	1	12	19	1	2	4	3	1	23	23	-2	0	-1	2	0	4	4
D: Informatie technologie	IA (Beveiligingsystemen - direct gekoppeld aan en	4	3	2	3	12	16	1	3	2	5	1	22	22	-2	0	0	2	0	6	6
D: Werktuigbouw	WTB Mechanisch en Pneumatisch	2	3	3	3	1	12	22	2	1	3	3	2	24	0	-2	0	0	1	2	2
D: Werktuigbouw	WTB Hydrauliek	2	3	5	2	12	19	2	2	4	1	2	21	21	0	-1	-1	-1	2	2	2
D: Civiele techniek	Civil Droog, Staal en conservering	1	5	5	1	12	18	1	2	5	3	1	21	21	0	-3	0	2	0	3	3
D: Civiele techniek	Waterbouw	1	4	6	1	12	19	1	2	5	3	1	21	21	0	-2	-1	2	0	2	2
D: Hydraulica	Watersystemen	4	5	2	1	12	13	3	1	6	1	1	17	17	-1	-4	4	0	0	4	4
D: Hydraulica	Waterloopkundige modellen	5	6	1	1	12	9	3	5	2	1	1	12	12	-2	-1	2	0	0	3	3
Ontwikkeling methodische 1.1. Leidraad ProBo		1	6	4	1	12	17	1	4	3	3	1	19	19	0	-2	-1	2	0	2	2
Ontwikkeling methodische 1.2. Integrale veiligheid		1	4	5	2	12	20	1	3	2	5	1	22	22	0	-1	-3	3	0	2	2
Ontwikkeling methodische 1.3. Cyber Security richtlijnen		1	5	5	1	12	18	1	2	4	3	1	23	23	0	-3	-1	2	1	5	5
Ontwikkeling methodische 1.4. Supplement inkoopstrategie		5	2	4	1	12	13	4	2	3	2	1	14	14	-1	0	-1	1	0	1	1
Ontwikkeling methodische 1.5. Systeem gerichte contractbeheersing		1	9	1	1	12	14	1	4	5	1	1	18	18	0	-3	4	-1	1	4	4
		51	97	91	53	8	300	470	33	57	85	75	26	556	-38	-40	-6	22	18	86	86



Classes



New tools





Recent studies suggest that the Antarctic ice sheet is much less stable than scientists once thought.

CLIMATE

Trigger seen for Antarctic collapse

Continued growth of greenhouse-gas emissions this century could raise sea levels more than 15 metres by 2500.

Nature, March 2016

**Antarctic model raises
prospect of unstoppable ice
collapse**


Sea levels could rise by more
than 15 meters by **2500**
if greenhouse-gas emissions
continue to grow.

Pollard, D. & DeConto, R. M. *Nature* <http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/nature17145> (2016).



Overstroming Petten in Google Earth.avi

If we do nothing.....





New policy principles on flood safety since 1995

- Rivers area: Room for the River
- Coastal zone: nature based solutions
- National policy document spatial planning:
 - Spatial planning based on water
- Flood safety act (1996):
 - + Regular assessment of levees
 - + flood protection program
 - + funding
- Water management 21st Century
 - Retain – store – discharge
- National policy document on Water
 - Multi-layer safety
- Delta programme
 - Risk based Flood safety standards




The road to flood safety 2050



Future impact on Maeslant Barrier



Closing frequency Maeslant Barrier



*Future studies
have been started*





***Thank you
Any questions?***

A black and white photograph of a large, complex support structure for wind turbines, likely a floating platform, viewed from underneath. The structure consists of numerous thick, dark, cylindrical legs that converge towards the center. The platform is situated over a body of water, with the legs and the sky reflected in the calm surface. In the background, other wind turbines and industrial structures are visible on the horizon under a cloudy sky.